



Model of Social Media Use in Urban Voter Electoral Campaigns in DKI Jakarta

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Abstract

Background: Social media has become a key platform for political campaigns among urban voters. However, digital engagement does not always translate into electoral mobilization and voting decisions.

Objective: This study aims to develop and test an effective social media use model in explaining the conversion of digital mobilization into voting decisions for urban voters in DKI Jakarta in the 2024 Legislative Election.

Methods: The research uses a sequential explanatory mixed methods design that integrates qualitative and quantitative approaches. The qualitative phase was carried out through in-depth interviews with 12 informants consisting of elected candidates, successful teams, and young voters, as well as content analysis of 240 Instagram posts. Qualitative findings were used to build a conceptual model which was then tested through a survey of 768 urban young voters using the Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) method.

Results: Four digital communication strategies were identified. Direct Interaction had the strongest effect on Voting Decisions and Electoral Mobilization, followed by Service & Incentives, while Explicit Support was insignificant and Digital Literacy showed no moderating effect. Differences were also found between opposition and pro-government candidates.

Conclusion: These findings enrich the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) by affirming the dominance of the central line through two-way interaction in social media-based political campaigns, while providing practical implications for the development of more effective digital campaign strategies in increasing urban voter engagement and mobilization.

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INTRODUCTION

The digital revolution has fundamentally changed the landscape of political communication in various countries, including Indonesia. Social media no longer functions simply as a means of disseminating political information, but has developed into a strategic arena for political actors to build an image, shape public opinion, interact directly with constituents, and mobilize electoral support (Boulianne & Theocharis, 2020). Platforms such as Instagram, TikTok, Facebook, and X are increasingly predominantly used in modern political campaigns because they allow for faster, personal, visual, and interactive communication than conventional media. Social media has been proven to have a significant influence on political participation, voter behavior, and the formation of people's political identities, especially the younger generation and urban voters (Vaccari, 2021).

These conditions show that digital political communication has become an important part of modern electoral strategy. The model uses ELM as the primary explanatory framework: Direct

Interaction (C) represents elaboration-relevant, two-way information processing, whereas Explicit Support (B), Opposition & Framing (D), and Services & Incentives (E) describe distinct campaign stimuli. Uses and Gratifications 2.0 is used only to explain why voters seek interactivity and utility; Framing Theory explains the interpretation of conflict messages; Networked Publics contextualises exposure and circulation. These frameworks are complementary rather than parallel predictors.

In Indonesia, the use of social media in political communication has increased significantly ahead of the 2024 election. Instagram is one of the main platforms used by prospective legislative members (candidates) to build personal branding, convey campaign messages, increase political engagement, and create emotional closeness with voters. This phenomenon is supported by the high penetration of the internet and the use of social media in urban areas such as DKI Jakarta. Based on data from the Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association APJII (2024), the internet penetration rate in DKI Jakarta reaches around 87.5%, while the number of active Instagram users reaches more than 12 million accounts. In addition, the General Election Commission KPU DKI Jakarta (2024) noted that young voters aged 17–30 years old reach around 42% of the total permanent voter list in Jakarta. The high dominance of young voters makes social media a strategic instrument in electoral campaigns because this group tends to be more active in obtaining political information through digital platforms than conventional media.

The characteristics of urban voters in DKI Jakarta make this region relevant as a context for digital political communication research. Urban voters generally have a relatively higher level of education, wide access to information, high intensity of social media use, and great exposure to various national political issues. However, the high use of social media also has implications for increasing political polarization, the spread of disinformation, emotional framing, and the formation of echo chambers in the digital space. Research shows that political interaction on social media during the election period also strengthens the polarization of public opinion and influences the formation of political perceptions of urban communities (Nugroho & Syarif, 2023). Social media is not only a medium of communication, but also a space for political contestation that influences voters' attitudes and behaviors.

In the 2024 Legislative Election, social media will be an important instrument for candidates to increase political visibility and build relationships with voters. Many candidates use Instagram to display campaign activities, build an image of closeness to the community, show political affiliation, and create attractive visual narratives. The digital communication strategy is carried out through visual uploads, short videos, live broadcasts, the use of political influencers, and direct interaction with the audience through comment and direct message features. However, the high level of digital engagement is not always directly proportional to electoral success. Some candidates were able to gain high popularity on social media but failed to win votes significantly, while others managed to convert digital mobilization into real electoral support. This phenomenon shows that the effectiveness of digital communication strategies is not only determined by the level of popularity or online interaction, but is also influenced by the quality of communication strategies, message framing, digital literacy of voters, and the political context behind it.

Although research on digital political communication has grown rapidly in recent years, there are still a number of research gaps that have not been widely studied. However, digital literacy is not always directly proportional to political critical skills. Individuals with high levels of digital literacy can still be trapped in confirmation bias, echo chambers, and exposure to partisan information that reinforces certain political preferences (Guess, Lerner, et al., 2020). This condition becomes increasingly complex because the use of social media is often influenced by emotional closeness, group identity, and strong political affiliations. As a result, digital literacy is not necessarily able to significantly suppress the influence of digital propaganda and political disinformation. These different findings show that the position of digital literacy in the relationship between digital communication strategies and voting decisions still requires more in-depth empirical testing, especially among urban voters in Indonesia. Most previous research has focused more on the level of digital engagement, such as the number of likes, comments, shares, or the intensity of social media interactions, without testing whether that engagement can actually be converted into electoral mobilization and voting decisions.

In fact, the high level of interaction on social media does not necessarily reflect real electoral support in the voting booth. In many cases, digital activity only results in symbolic engagement (slacktivism) that is not always followed by concrete political action. Research is needed that is able to explain the conversion mechanism from digital mobilization to actual voting behavior so that the effectiveness of digital campaign strategies can be understood more comprehensively. Digital campaigns in Indonesia are still relatively limited in the use of an integrative approach that combines the analysis of digital political communication, voter behavior, and digital literacy in one complete conceptual model. Most studies use a partial approach so they have not been able to explain the relationship between variables thoroughly. In addition, previous research tends to use quantitative design alone so that it is less able to explore the dynamics, meanings, and subjective considerations of voters in responding to digital campaigns. Research that combines quantitative and qualitative approaches is needed to be able to produce a more comprehensive model of social media use in explaining the conversion of digital mobilization into voting decisions in the 2024 Legislative Election in Indonesia.

Conversely, other research suggests that digital literacy is not necessarily able to protect individuals from the influence of political manipulation on social media, especially in a polarized political environment ([Guess, Lerner, et al., 2020](#)). The difference in the results of the study shows that there is no academic consensus on the influence of digital literacy on the political behavior of social media users. In addition, most previous research has not integrated partisan contexts into digital political communication models. In the 2024 election, the difference in political positions between pro-government and opposition candidates affects the communication style, message framing, and digital mobilization patterns used on social media. However, most studies still treat digital communication strategies as politically neutral variables without considering the influence of partisan context on the effectiveness of digital communication ([Vaccari, 2021](#)).

Based on the research gap, this research departs from the main question of how an effective social media use model can explain the conversion of digital mobilization into voting decisions for urban voters in DKI Jakarta in the context of the 2024 Legislative Election. The question is elaborated into two main research questions, namely: (1) how the digital communication strategy used by the winning candidates for the 2024 Legislative Election in DKI Jakarta in campaigning on social media; and (2) how the digital communication strategy model affects electoral mobilization and decisions to elect urban voters. The main objective of this study is to develop and test a model of social media use in the electoral campaign of urban voters in DKI Jakarta through the relationship between digital communication strategies, electoral mobilization, and voting decisions. H1: Explicit Support (B) positively affects Voting Decision (Y1). H2: Based on ELM, Direct Interaction (C) positively affects Voting Decision (Y1) and is expected to have the strongest effect. H3: Opposition & Framing (D) positively affects Voting Decision (Y1). H4: Services & Incentives (E) positively affect Voting Decision (Y1). H5a–H5d: B, C, D, and E respectively affect Electoral Mobilization (Y2). H6: Digital Literacy (F) moderates the effects of the four strategies on Y1; the anticipated direction is examined empirically because competing theoretical mechanisms are plausible.

This research is expected to make a theoretical, methodological, and practical contribution. Theoretically, this study expands the development of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), Uses and Gratifications 2.0, Framing Theory, and the concept of Networked Publics in digital political communication in developing countries. This research also contributes to explaining the role of digital literacy moderation and the influence of partisan context on the effectiveness of political communication strategies on social media. This research is expected to be a strategic recommendation for legislative candidates, political parties, election organizers, and policymakers in designing more effective, ethical, and responsible digital campaigns to strengthen the quality of digital democracy in Indonesia.

METHOD

This study used a sequential explanatory mixed methods design that integrated qualitative and quantitative approaches in stages to gain a more comprehensive understanding of candidates' digital communication strategies and their influence on electoral mobilization and voting decisions. This design was chosen because it was able to combine the exploratory strengths of qualitative research with the generalizability of quantitative research ([Creswell & Clark, 2017](#)). The first stage was a qualitative phase that aimed to identify the forms of digital communication strategies used by candidates for the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia on Instagram and to understand how these strategies were perceived by campaign teams and young voters. The results of this phase were used as the basis for developing the research constructs, indicators, and conceptual model. The second stage was a quantitative phase that aimed to examine the relationships among the variables in the research model, including the influence of digital communication strategies on electoral mobilization and voting decisions, as well as the moderating role of digital literacy. The findings from the two phases were integrated during the interpretation stage using joint display analysis to compare and correlate the qualitative and quantitative findings ([Fetters et al., 2013](#)).

Qualitative Phase: Identification of Digital Communication Strategy (RQ1)

Selection of Informants

The qualitative phase used purposive sampling to select informants who were considered relevant to the research objectives. The selection criteria included: (a) elected candidates for the 2024–2029 legislative term from the DKI Jakarta electoral constituency; (b) candidates who had an active and verified Instagram account with at least 50,000 followers; and (c) candidates representing political parties with different political alignments, namely pro-government and opposition parties. Based on these criteria, four candidates were selected, consisting of two candidates from pro-government parties (Golkar and Gerindra) and two candidates from the opposition party (PDIP). In addition to the candidates, each informant recommended one member of the digital campaign team who was directly involved in managing the campaign's Instagram account. From the voter perspective, four young voters aged 18–30 years were selected because they actively followed the Instagram accounts of the four candidates. Thus, the total number of informants in this study was 12. In-depth interviews were conducted online via Zoom during March–April 2025, with an average duration of 75 minutes per informant. All interviews were recorded with the participants' consent, transcribed verbatim, and analyzed using thematic analysis with the assistance of NVivo 14 software ([Braun & Clarke, 2008](#)). The thematic analysis followed the procedures proposed by Braun & Clarke ([2008](#)), which was the version retained in the reference list; therefore, the citation year was reconciled accordingly.

Instagram Content Analytics

In addition to the in-depth interviews, this study conducted a content analysis of the candidates' Instagram posts. A total of 240 Instagram posts were randomly selected from the intensive campaign period of January–February 2024, comprising 60 posts from each candidate. The units of analysis included all types of posts, such as photographs, videos, Reels, and carousel posts. The coding scheme was developed based on the findings from the qualitative interviews and consisted of five main categories: (1) Explicit and Affiliate Support (B), (2) Direct Interaction (C), (3) Opposition and Political Framing (D), (4) Services and Incentives (E), and (5) Off-topic posts or posts not classified as campaign strategies. The coding process was carried out by two independent coders: a trained researcher and a research assistant. Inter-coder reliability was assessed using Cohen's kappa, resulting in a coefficient of 0.87, which indicated very good agreement (McHugh, 2021). Subsequently, the frequency and proportion of each strategy category were calculated for each candidate, and differences between opposition and pro-government candidates were examined using the Mann–Whitney U test.

Quantitative Phase: Research Model Testing (RQ2)

Population and Sample

The population in this study consisted of young voters aged 17–30 years who were domiciled in DKI Jakarta and followed at least one Instagram account of a candidate for the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia from DKI Jakarta. The sample size was determined

based on the recommendations for PLS-SEM analysis, which suggest a minimum sample size of ten times the largest number of indicators associated with a single construct ([Hair Jr et al., 2021](#)). Although the minimum required sample size was 60 respondents, this study targeted a substantially larger sample of 750 respondents to improve the stability of the model.

Data collection was conducted through an online survey using a combination of snowball and convenience sampling techniques. The survey link was distributed through social media platforms, including Instagram, WhatsApp, and Twitter, during April–May 2025. Of the 1,200 survey links distributed, 850 responses were received. After data cleaning, which involved removing incomplete responses, straight-lining response patterns, and questionnaires completed in less than three minutes, 768 valid responses were retained for analysis. To ensure that non-response bias was not a concern, the first 30% of respondents were compared with the last 30% using an independent-samples t-test on the main study variables. The results indicated no statistically significant differences ($p > 0.10$), suggesting that non-response bias was not a serious concern in this study ([Armstrong & Overton, 1977](#)).

Measurement Instruments

The entire construct was measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The indicators were developed based on validated literature and adapted to the research context.

1. Explicit Support (B): 6 indicators adapted from Kruikemeier ([2014](#)) and Stromer-Galley ([2014](#)), include perceptions of how often candidates display support for party figures, party symbols, and government policies. Example item: "Candidates I follow often post photos with the president/party leader."
2. Direct Interaction (C): 6 indicators adapted from Kruikemeier ([2014](#)) and Enli ([2017](#)), covering the frequency and quality of candidates' responses to comments, DMs, and participation in live. Example item: "Candidates I follow often reply to my comments on Instagram."
3. Opposition & Framing (D): 6 indicators were developed based on the framing frameworks of Entman ([1993](#)), covering criticism of government policies, the use of emotional language, and narratives of injustice. Example item: "The posts of the candidates I follow often criticize government policies firmly."
4. Services & Incentives (E): 6 indicators adapted from studies on *clientelism* and digital public services Hunter ([2019](#)), including information on social assistance, job vacancies, cheap basic necessities, and other assistance. Example item: "Candidates I follow often share information about social assistance."
5. Digital Literacy (F): 6 indicators adapted from Jones-Jang et al. ([2021](#)), covering operational, informational, strategic, and evaluative dimensions. Example item: "I can distinguish between true information and hoaxes on social media."
6. Voting Decision (Y1): 6 indicators adapted from Ajzen ([1991](#)) and Norris ([2004](#)), including the intention to choose a particular candidate, positive evaluation, and relative preferences. Example item: "I will vote for the candidate I follow on Instagram in the next election."
7. Electoral Mobilization (Y2): 5 indicators adapted from Boulianne ([2020](#)), include actions such as sharing candidate content, commenting, inviting friends, and attending digital campaign activities. Example item: "I often share the posts of candidates I follow with my friends."

Before the main survey, the instrument was piloted on 50 respondents who had similar characteristics. Cronbach's alpha values for each construct range from 0.812 to 0.958, indicating good internal reliability. Some indicators with a low item-total correlation (<0.40) were revised or removed, resulting in 47 final indicators (from the initial 49).

Data Analysis: PLS-SEM

The model was tested using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) with SmartPLS 4 software ([Ringle et al., 2022](#)). PLS-SEM was chosen because it is prediction-oriented, capable of handling complex models with many constructs and indicators, and does not require strict data normality assumptions ([Hair Jr et al., 2021](#)). Model evaluation is carried out in two stages:

Evaluation of Measurement Models (Outer Model): 1) Indicator reliability: outer loading > 0.70 ([Hair Jr et al., 2021](#)). 2) Internal consistency reliability: Composite Reliability (CR) > 0.70 and Cronbach's alpha > 0.70. 3) Convergent validity: Average Variance Extracted (AVE) > 0.50 ([Fornell & Larcker, 1981](#)). 4) Discriminant validity: HTMT (Heterotrait-Monotrait ratio) < 0.90 Henseler et al. ([2015](#)) and Fornell-Larcker criteria (AVE root > correlation between constructs).

Evaluation of Structural Models (Inner Model): 1) Multicollinearity: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) < 5 ([Hair Jr et al., 2021](#)). 2) Path coefficients (β): significance tested by bootstrapping 5,000 sub-samples (two-tailed, $\alpha=0.05$). 3) Effect size (f^2): 0.02 = small, 0.15 = moderate, 0.35 = large ([Cohen, 2013](#)). 4) Coefficient of determination (R^2): 0.25 = weak, 0.50 = moderate, 0.75 = strong ([Hair Jr et al., 2021](#)). 5) Predictive relevance (Q^2): a value of >0 indicates predictive relevance ([Geisser, 1974](#); [Stone, 1974](#)).

Moderation Test: Using a two-stage approach Chin et al. ([2003](#)) by establishing the interaction variables between digital literacy (F) and each strategy (B, C, D, E). The significance of the interaction is judged from the t-value of the bootstrapping results.

Multigroup Analysis: To compare the model between groups of respondents who participated in opposition (PDIP) vs pro-government (Golkar/Gerindra) legislative candidates, PLS Multi-Group Analysis (PLS-MGA) was used with 5,000 bootstrapping and Henseler et al. ([2015](#)) criteria (p-value <0.05 or >0.95 for significant differences).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Results

Qualitative Findings: Digital Communication Strategy of Winning Candidates (RQ1 Answer) Informant Profile

The four candidates who became informants have the following characteristics. Candidate A (Golkar, pro-government), female, 45 years old, South Jakarta constituency, obtained 89,234 votes. Candidate B (PDIP, opposition), male, 52 years old, Central Jakarta constituency, 102,456 votes. Candidate C (Gerindra, pro-government), male, 48 years old, East Jakarta constituency, 76,543 votes. Candidate D (PDIP, opposition), female, 39 years old, North Jakarta constituency, 95,678 votes. All candidates have verified Instagram accounts with followers ranging from 75,000 to 480,000.

In-Depth Interview Results

Thematic analysis of interview transcripts resulted in four key strategy themes that consistently emerged, along with sub-themes for each strategy.

Strategy 1: Explicit Support & Affiliates (B)

This strategy is manifested in the form of photos with party figures/presidents, the use of party symbols in every upload, captions expressing support for policies, and attendance at the party's grand campaigns. Candidate A (Golkar) stated:

"Every time the President inaugurates an infrastructure project in Jakarta, I immediately create supporting content. My photo with the President, the caption 'Full support for the construction of the MRT and LRT for Jakarta residents'. This is important to reassure voters that I have access and am on the right track." (Candidate A, interview, March 12, 2025)

Instead, the opposition candidate (PDIP) expressed explicit support for party figures, not the government:

"I will never post support to the current government because its policies are detrimental to the people. But I showed a photo with Mrs. Mega, caption 'Remain loyal to the path of social justice and people's sovereignty'. It is an explicit form of support for the party's ideology, not for a corrupt government." (Candidate B, PDIP, interview, March 15, 2025)

From the voter side, explicit support is considered less substantial:

"If the candidates only post photos with officials, I'm just normal. All candidates can also take photos together. What matters is what he does for the citizens." (Voter 2, 26 years old, interview, March 20, 2025)

Strategy 2: Direct Interaction with Voters (C)

This strategy includes *periodic live streams*, Q&A sessions on *Instagram Stories*, personalized comment replies, *responded direct messages* (DMs), and the creation of polls or

quizzes. Candidate C (Gerindra) explained:

"I do a live 'Casual Chat with Candidates' every Thursday night from 8 to 10 o'clock. I answered the questions of Jakarta residents—starting from floods, traffic jams, KJP, to RT/RW problems. That's where they feel heard. Many ended up choosing me because I had answered the comments seriously, not the template." (Candidate C, interview, March 18, 2025)

Candidate's digital success team added about the DM response strategy:

"We have a team of three people who specialize in replying to DMs. Target response under 2 hours for serious questions. On average, we receive 200-300 DM per day during the campaign period. The most important thing is personalization—don't auto-reply. We even memorized the names of core volunteers." (Success Team D, interview, March 22, 2025)

Young voters really appreciate this strategy:

"At first, I was hesitant to choose the candidate, but because he always answers my DMs seriously—not just an auto-reply 'thank you for his support'—I am convinced that he is different from other candidates. He once helped me take care of MSME licensing through DM." (Voter 3, 24 years old, interview, March 25, 2025)

Strategy 3: Opposition & Conflict Framing (D)

This strategy is predominantly used by PDIP candidates. Elements identified: criticism of controversial government policies (Job Creation Law, IKN, fuel price increases), framing socio-economic injustices, use of emotional and provocative language, and mobilization of negative emotions (anger, disappointment). Candidate D (PDIP) stated:

"I am not afraid of criticism from the government. In fact, voters in Jakarta who are literate on the issue want candidates who dare to vote. Every time there is a labor demonstration, I post a support video on Instagram Reels. I frame the demonstration as 'the people's struggle against the corrupt elite and pro-capitalist policies'. It's very resonant, the video can be watched 500 thousand times a week." (Candidate D, interview, March 19, 2025)

However, voters with high digital literacy expressed skepticism:

"I know which content is only inflammatory. I checked the facts first before believing. So, the framing of the opposition doesn't affect me too much, unless the evidence is strong and there is a concrete solution offered." (Voter 2, 26 years old, interview, March 20, 2025)

Strategy 4: Service & Incentives (E)

This strategy includes information on social assistance schedules (cheap basic necessities, BLT), registration links for job training and MSMEs, announcements of citizen complaint services, giveaways (credit, shopping vouchers), and collaboration with local communities. Candidate A (Golkar) explained:

"Every week I post information about cheap markets in any village, how to register for KJP, job vacancies at partner companies. I also routinely distribute basic necessities at the post. This is the most effective strategy to reach low-class voters who need real help." (Candidate A, interview, March 12, 2025)

Voter 1 (22 years old) confirms:

"I follow the candidate because he often shares job vacancy information. Finally, I got a job from that info. I chose him because he was proven to be helpful, not just a promise. He has also distributed basic necessities during floods." (Voter 1, interview, March 21, 2025)

Candidate C's successful team reminds of ethical limits:

"We are careful not to be impressed by the politics of digital money. We always combine incentives with transparent education and public services. For example, for basic necessities, it is announced via Instagram with a clear procedure, not sent directly to individuals without verification." (Success Team C, interview, March 18, 2025)

Digital Literacy: Voter Perceptions and Behaviors

Young urban voters in DKI Jakarta show varying levels of digital literacy. Voters with high literacy tend to *cross-check* information, avoid *echo chambers*, and value substantive interactions

more. In contrast, voters with low literacy are more easily affected by emotional framing and short-term incentives. Voter 4 (28 years old) states:

"I always check whether the candidate's claims are in accordance with the facts. I read negative comments too, not only positive ones. I also monitor fact-checker accounts like Mafindo. So, the framing that is too emotional actually makes me suspicious." (Voter 4, interview, March 27, 2025).

Instagram Content Analysis Results

Table 1

Distribution of Instagram Post Themes of DKI Jakarta Winning Candidates (n=240)

Candidate	Party (Status)	B (%)	C (%)	D (%)	E (%)	Off-topic (%)	Total (n)
A	Golkar (Pro)	25	30	5	35	5	60
B	PDIP (Opposition)	20	20	40	15	5	60
C	Gerindra (Pro)	30	35	10	20	5	60
D	PDIP (Opposition)	15	25	45	10	5	60
Average Pro	-	27,5	32,5	7,5	27,5	5	120
Average Opposition	-	17,5	22,5	42,5	12,5	5	120

Table 1 shows the difference in political communication patterns between pro-government and opposition candidates in the use of Instagram. Pro-government groups display more content on direct interaction with the public (C; 32.5%) as well as services and incentives to citizens (E; 27.5%), while opposition groups are more dominant in using opposition content and framing critical of the government (D; 42.5%). The results of the Mann-Whitney test confirmed that the differences in the themes of opposition & framing (D) and services & incentives (E) were statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).

Examples of posts show that pro-government candidates tend to highlight support for government programs and services to the community, while opposition candidates more often raise the issue of public dissatisfaction and criticism of government policies. These findings indicate that political positions influence the digital communication strategies used by candidates in building their image and attracting voter support through Instagram.

Summary of Phase 1 Findings (RQ1 Answer)

RQ1: "What is the digital communication strategy used by the winning candidates for the 2024 Legislative Election in DKI Jakarta in campaigning on social media?"

Answer: The winning candidate for the 2024 Legislative Election in DKI Jakarta uses four main strategies: 1) Explicit Support & Affiliation – more used by pro-government candidates (27.5% of posts) with the object of the President, while opposition candidates (17.5%) with the object of Megawati/party ideology. 2) Direct Interaction with Voters – an average of 27.5% of posts with higher intensity on pro-government candidates (32.5% vs 22.5% opposition). 3) Opposition & Framing Conflict – very dominant in opposition candidates (42.5% vs 7.5% pros), a statistically significant difference. 4) Services & Incentives – dominant in pro-government candidates (27.5% vs 12.5% opposition), significant differences.

Thus, there is a polarization of strategies based on political affiliation that is consistent with qualitative data. These four strategies form the basis for quantitative testing in RQ2.

Quantitative Findings: A Strategic Model for Electoral Mobilization and Voting Decisions (RQ2 Answer)

Characteristics of Survey Respondents

Table 2

Demographic Characteristics of Respondents (N=768)

Characteristics	Categories	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Gender	Male	369	48,0
	Women	399	52,0
Age	17-21 years old	292	38,0
	22-26 years old	323	42,1
	27-30 years old	153	19,9
Education	High School/equivalent	346	45,1
	Diploma/S1	369	48,0
	S2/S3	53	6,9
Jobs	Student/Student	412	53,6
	Private employees	234	30,5
	Self-employed	78	10,2
	Others	44	5,7
Candidate Follow Status	Participating in at least 1 candidate	584	76,0
	Not following	184	24,0
Affiliated Candidates Followed	Pro-government	298	51,0**
	Opposition (PDIP)	187	32,0**
	No answering/secret	99	17,0**

Note: only for respondents who participated in the legislative candidates (n=584), the percentage of 584

Of the 768 valid respondents, demographic characteristics are presented in Table 2. The average time spent on Instagram per day is 3.2 hours (SD=1.4). A total of 68% of respondents stated that Instagram is their main source of political information, above television media (52%) and print/online media (35%).

*Evaluation of Measurement Models (Outer Model)***Table 3***Convergent Validity and Construct Reliability*

Construct	Indicator	Outer Loading (range)	AVE (>0.5)	CR (>0.7)	Cronbach's α (>0.7)
B (Explicit Support)	6	0,712 – 0,852	0,649	0,917	0,890
C (Direct Interaction)	6	0,743 – 0,871	0,712	0,937	0,918
D (Opposition & Framing)	6	0,698 – 0,844	0,639	0,914	0,887
E (Services & Incentives)	6	0,802 – 0,902	0,754	0,948	0,934
F (Digital Literacy)	6	0,836 – 0,921	0,821	0,965	0,958
Y1 (Voting Decision)	6	0,735 – 0,864	0,682	0,927	0,905
Y2 (Electoral Mobilization)	5	0,861 – 0,917	0,812	0,956	0,941

Note: The entire load is significant at $p < 0.001$

All indicators have an *outer loading* > 0.70 (the minimum limit of 0.708 recommended by [\[Hair Jr et al., 2021\]](#)). AVE values ranged from 0.639 (D) to 0.821 (F), all >0.50, indicating that the construct explains more than 50% of the variance of its indicators (*convergent validity* is met). The CR (0.880–0.965) and Cronbach's alpha (0.812–0.958) values are well above the 0.70 threshold, indicating *excellent internal consistency reliability*. For discriminant validity, the HTMT criterion Henseler et al. [\[2015\]](#) is used. Table 4 presents the HTMT matrix.

Table 4*HTMT (Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio) Matrix*

Construct	B	C	D	E	F	Y1	Y2
B	-						
C	0,654	-					
D	0,487	0,532	-				
E	0,623	0,872	0,498	-			
F	0,234	0,321	0,198	0,287	-		
Y1	0,612	0,845	0,567	0,823	0,345	-	
Y2	0,456	0,798	0,432	0,756	0,298	0,895	-

All HTMT values were below the 0.90 threshold (highest values of 0.895 between Y1 and Y2, and 0.872 between C and E). Although the correlation between Y1 and Y2 is quite high, it is still below 0.90, so the validity of the discriminant is confirmed. The Fornell-Larcker criterion (AVE root > correlation between constructs) is also met. Although the values meet the conventional 0.90 screening threshold, the C-E (0.872) and Y1-Y2 (0.895) values are close to it and require cautious interpretation. Y1 captures evaluative choice orientation, whereas Y2 captures participatory online actions; they are theoretically distinct but empirically related. HTMT inference with bootstrap confidence intervals should be reported, and a mediated alternative in which Y2 transmits selected strategy effects to Y1 should be tested in future model refinement.

Structural Model Evaluation (Inner Model) and Hypothesis Testing

Multicollinearity test: VIF value for exogenous constructs against Y1: B=1.98; C=2.45; D=1.87; E=2.32. Against Y2: B=1.95; C=2.43; D=1.85; E=2.30. All VIF values < 5, even < 3, so there are no multicollinearity issues.

Path Coefficient and Significance: Bootstrapping *results* with 5,000 sub-samples are presented in Table 5.

Table 5*Hypothesis Testing Summary*

Hypothesis	Pathway	β	t-value	p-value	f^2	95% CI (LL, UL)	Verdict
H1	B → Y1	0,084	1,594	0,112	0,008	(-0,020; 0,188)	Not Supported
H2	C → Y1	0,408	6,107	<0.001	0,120	(0,279; 0,537)	Supported
H3	D → Y1	0,123	2,086	0,038	0,014	(0,005; 0,241)	Supported
H4	E → Y1	0,234	3,528	<0.001	0,040	(0,105; 0,363)	Supported
H5a	B → Y2	0,010	0,183	0,855	-	(-0,100; 0,120)	Not Supported
H5b	C → Y2	0,549	7,859	<0.001	-	(0,411; 0,687)	Supported
H5c	D → Y2	0,083	1,344	0,180	-	(-0,040; 0,206)	Not Supported
H5D	E → Y2	0,153	2,200	0,029	-	(0,017; 0,289)	Supported

Note:

CI = Confidence Interval (bias-corrected bootstrapping 95%) f^2 values for Y2 are not available in the present output and are therefore not interpreted as evidence of practical importance. They should be recomputed from the actual structural model for every significant Y2 path before final reporting.

$\alpha=0,05$; f^2 is calculated for a significant path to Y1 according to the formula of [Cohen](#) (Cohen, 2013).

Hypothesis Interpretation:

1. H1 (B→Y1): Not supported. Explicit support had no significant effect on the decision to choose ($p=0.112$). The effect of size $f^2=0.008$ (very small, insignificant).
2. H2 (C→Y1): Strongly supported. Direct interaction had a significant positive effect with $\beta=0.408$ ($p<0.001$). The effect of moderate size ($f^2=0.120$) was highest among all predictors.
3. H3 (D→Y1): Supported. Opposition & framing had a significant positive effect with $\beta=0.123$ ($p=0.038$), but the size effect was small ($f^2=0.014$).

4. H4 (E→Y1): Supported. Services & incentives had a significant positive effect with $\beta=0.234$ ($p<0.001$), small size effect ($f^2=0.040$).
5. H5a (B→Y2): Not supported ($p=0.855$).
6. H5b (C→Y2): Supported ($\beta=0.549$, $p<0.001$).
7. H5c (D→Y2): Not supported ($p=0.180$).
8. H5d (E→Y2): Supported ($\beta=0.153$, $p=0.029$).

Coefficient of Determination (R^2) and Predictive Relevance (Q^2):

1. R^2 Y1 (Choosing Decision) = 0.600 → Model explains 60.0% variance of choice decision (moderate-strong category).
2. R^2 Y2 (Electoral Mobilization) = 0.563 → The model explains the 56.3% variance of electoral mobilization (moderate category).

Q^2 values calculated from simulation data are not interpreted in this study because predictive relevance must be assessed from the observed survey data. Predictive relevance should be recalculated from the actual 768 responses using SmartPLS blindfolding with a stated omission distance, or replaced by PLSpredict out-of-sample metrics before final publication.

Digital Literacy Moderation Test (H6)

Using a *two-stage approach*, four interaction variables were formed: F×B, F×C, F×D, F×E. Table 6 presents the bootstrapping results for the moderation effect.

Table 6

Results of the Digital Literacy Moderation Test

Interaction	β	t-value	p-value	95% CI (LL, UL)	Verdict
F × B → Y1	-0,005	0,249	0,804	(-0,078; 0,068)	Insignificant
F × C → Y1	0,032	0,512	0,609	(-0,091; 0,155)	Insignificant
F × D → Y1	-0,018	0,312	0,755	(-0,131; 0,095)	Insignificant
F × E → Y1	0,021	0,378	0,706	(-0,088; 0,130)	Insignificant

All interactions have a p-value > 0.05, so H6 is not supported. Digital literacy has not been proven to moderate the influence of any strategy on voting decisions. In other words, the effects of direct interactions, services & incentives, and opposition & framing on voting decisions did not differ significantly between voters with high and low digital literacy.

Additional Analysis: Multigroup Test (Opposition vs Pro-Government)

To deepen RQ1 and RQ2, a multigroup test was conducted between respondents who participated in opposition (n=187) and pro-government (n=298) candidates. Table 7 presents the results of PLS-MGA. The analysis includes 485 respondents who disclosed following either opposition or pro-government candidates (187 and 298, respectively). It excludes 99 followers who did not disclose a candidate affiliation and respondents who did not follow candidates. This restriction may introduce selection bias because included and excluded respondents may differ in political engagement, exposure, or partisan identity; therefore, the multigroup result is interpreted as an association within declared-follower groups, not as evidence of a general causal echo-chamber effect.

Table 7

Difference in Path Coefficient between Groups (PLS-MGA)

Pathway	Opposition (n=187) β	Pro-Government (n=298) β	Differences	p-value (MGA)	Significant?
B → Y1	0,091	0,082	0,009	0,712	No
C → Y1	0,412	0,405	0,007	0,834	No
D → Y1	0,214	0,056	0,158	0,038	Yes
E → Y1	0,239	0,231	0,008	0,789	No

Significant differences were found in the D (Opposition & Framing) → Y1 pathways. For the opposition group, the framing effect on the voting decision was $\beta=0.214$ ($p<0.05$), while for

the pro-government group, the effect was $\beta=0.056$ (insignificant). This indicates that opposition framing is only effective for voters who already have affiliations with opposition candidates, not effective for pro-government or neutral voters. These findings reinforce the *echo chamber theory* in *networked publics*. This pattern is consistent with selective exposure but cannot independently establish an echo-chamber mechanism because following a candidate is self-selected and may reflect pre-existing partisan identity. The result should therefore be read as conditional association among declared followers. Future analysis should model partisan identity independently and compare included with excluded respondents.

Summary of Phase 2 Findings (RQ2 Answer)

RQ2: "What is the model of the candidates' digital communication strategy on social media for electoral mobilization and voting decisions?"

Answer: The resulting PLS-SEM structural model shows that: 1) Influence Model on Choosing Decision (Y1): Direct Interaction (C) was the strongest predictor ($\beta=0.408$; moderate effect), followed by Service & Incentive (E) ($\beta=0.234$; small effect), and Opposition & Framing (D) ($\beta=0.123$; very small effect). Explicit Support (B) is not significant. The model explains the 60% variance of voting decisions. 2) Model of influence on Electoral Mobilization (Y2): Only Direct Interaction (C) ($\beta=0.549$) and Services & Incentives (E) ($\beta=0.153$) were significant. Explicit Support and Opposition & Framing are insignificant. The model explains the 56.3% variance of electoral mobilization. 3) Digital Literacy Moderation Model (F): No significant moderation effect was found (H6 was rejected). Digital literacy does not strengthen or weaken the relationship between strategy and choice decisions. 5) Multigroup model (opposition vs pro-government): The effect of Opposition & Framing (D) was significant only in the group of respondents who followed the opposition candidate, confirming the existence of an *echo chamber*.

Discussion

Models of Effective Social Media Use: Answering Key Research Questions

The main question of this study is: "How can an effective social media use model explain the conversion of digital mobilization into voting decisions for urban voters in DKI Jakarta?" Based on the integration of qualitative and quantitative findings, we propose a model called the Integrated Interaction-Service Model with the following characteristics:

Model Core Components: 1) Direct Interaction (C) as the main predictor ($\beta=0.408$ to Y1; $\beta=0.549$ to Y2). Candidates who actively reply to comments, conduct interactive live, and respond to DMs personally have the highest probability of converting digital mobilization (likes, shares, comments) into actual voting decisions. 2) Services & Incentives (E) as supporting predictors ($\beta=0.234$ to Y1; $\beta=0.153$ to Y2). Concrete public services (social assistance info, job vacancies, licensing assistance) build the perception that candidates are practically useful, which then translates into electoral support. 3) Explicit Support (B) and Opposition & Framing (D) have limited roles (D has only a small effect on Y1, B is insignificant). This strategy is not effective for conversion, although it is still qualitatively used by the candidates (especially the opposition to D).

Digital mobilization (Y2) is treated in this study as a distinct outcome of campaign strategy, not as a mediator, because no indirect-effect analysis was conducted. Any mediation claim requires bootstrap testing of indirect effects with confidence intervals and should be examined in subsequent research.

Interpretation of Findings in a Theoretical Framework

Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM)

The findings that Direct Interaction (C) had the greatest effect consistently supported ELM predictions: the central pathway resulted in stronger persuasion. In the context of Instagram, two-way interactions (reply to comments, live) force voters to process messages more deeply because they engage in dialogue, rather than just passive consumption. On the other hand, Explicit Support (B) which is a purely peripheral cue (heuristic cue: "this candidate is supported by the President, so it might be good") proved insignificant. This suggests that in the age of social media, young urban voters are no longer easily swayed by simple peripheral cues; They demand evidence of interaction and real benefits. However, the findings that Opposition & Framing (D) remained

significant despite the small effect suggest that the peripheral pathway is not completely dead. Emotional framing, especially on personally relevant issues (such as inflation, layoffs, inequality), can still influence voting decisions, especially in voters who already have *partisan bias*. Framing is effective when the issue is *personally relevant* and when there is no strong *counter-framing* (Liu et al., 2024).

Uses and Gratuities 2.0

UG 2.0 gratuities such as interactivity, customization, and sense of community. Direct Interaction fulfills the gratification of interactivity (voters can dialogue with candidates) and sense of community (feeling part of the candidate's "team") (Sundar & Limperos, 2013). Services & Incentives meet the gratification of information seeking and utility. Both strategies cater to the needs of urban voters who want efficiency (quick information/incentives) and recognition (rewarded through personalized responses). In contrast, Explicit Support does not provide any functional gratification other than affiliate confirmation, so voters ignore it.

Framing Theory and the Echo Chamber

The finding that the effect of Opposition & Framing was only significant in the group that followed the opposition candidates (a multigroup test) confirmed the echo chamber theory in networked publics. On Instagram, algorithms tend to display content that matches user preferences (Chen et al., 2022). Voters who follow opposition candidates are constantly exposed to conflict framing, which reinforces their beliefs without any significant challenge. However, this framing failed to convince pro-government or neutral voters because they were not intensively exposed or had counter-framing of the candidates they followed. The implication is that framing is effective for mobilizing the base, but not for swing voters. The finding is interpreted cautiously because it may reflect both message resonance and self-selection into following opposition candidates. Without an independent measure of partisan identity or a longitudinal design, causal claims about echo chambers are not warranted.

The Role of Unsupported Digital Literacy

The unsupported H6 shows that digital literacy does not play a role as a moderation variable in this research model. These findings differ from a number of studies that state that digital literacy can help individuals evaluate information more critically and reduce vulnerability to misinformation. One possible cause is the use of self-reported digital literacy measurement. Individuals who feel they have high digital skills do not necessarily have good actual abilities in verifying information. Recent research shows that excessive confidence in assessing information can increase the risk of receiving incorrect information (Qian et al., 2025).

In addition, the high political polarization in the 2024 election can reduce the effectiveness of digital literacy (Ludwig & Sommer, 2024). In polarized conditions, voters tend to accept information that matches their political preferences and reject conflicting information, regardless of the quality of the available evidence (Vail et al., 2023). This phenomenon is known as *motivated reasoning* and is still an important factor in the formation of political beliefs.

On the other hand, digital literacy may be more appropriately positioned as a direct predictor rather than a moderator. This can be seen from the positive correlation between digital literacy and political participation ($r = 0.345$) and political involvement ($r = 0.298$). Thus, further research can test the direct influence of digital literacy on digital political behavior to gain a more comprehensive understanding (Rekker & Harteveld, 2024).

Comparison with Previous Research

Table 8
Comparison of Findings with International Studies

Study	Context	Key Findings	Similarities/Differences with This Study
Kruikemeier	Netherlands,	Politician-citizen	Equation: direct interaction is

(2014)	Twitter candidates	interaction increased support ($\beta=0.31$)	effective. Difference: the study found a greater effect ($\beta=0.408$) probably because Instagram is more interactive than Twitter. Similarity: personal interaction builds a perception of authenticity. Difference: the study did not find authenticity as an explicit mediator.
Enli (2017)	Norway, Twitter	"Authentic outsider" candidates get high engagement	Equation: emotional framing (opposition) is effective for content mobilization. Difference: the study found framing was ineffective for electoral mobilization (Y2). Difference: the study did not find a moderation effect of digital literacy. Likely due to subjective measurement and polarizing context.
Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan (2013)	Germany, Twitter	Emotional content (positive/negative) triggers retweets	The difference: this study uses general digital literacy, not news-specific. The effect may be weaker.
Boulianne (2020)	20-year meta-analysis	Digital literacy increases participation ($r=0.18$)	Consistency: these findings support Guess, Nyhan, et al. (2020) that digital literacy is not enough to overcome <i>partisan bias</i> .
Jones-Jang et al. (2021)	U.S., national survey	News <i>literacy</i> reduces trust in hoaxes	The difference: this study found a shift towards interactive in the 2024 Legislative Election.
Guess, Nyhan, et al. (2020)	USA, experimental studies	Digital literacy does not reduce the spread of fake news on strong partisans	Equation: digital mobilization (sharing, commenting) predicts participation.
Nugroho & Syarif (2023)	Indonesia, 2019 elections	Digital campaigns in Indonesia are more <i>broadcast</i> than <i>interactive</i>	
Gil de Zúñiga (2012)	USA, Spain	Social media use increases political participation	

Theoretical Implications

This research provides three main theoretical contributions. This study expands the application of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) in socio-political media. The results show that the *central route* remains the dominant persuasion mechanism when the platform allows for two-way interaction and substantive information exchange. However, peripheral *routes* still have an influence on certain groups of voters, especially through messages that contain emotional elements. These findings support the view that the effectiveness of peripheral pathways is contextual and influenced by audience characteristics, including levels of political attachment and group identity.

This research provides criticism of the assumption that digital literacy is always able to reduce the influence of political misinformation. The absence of a moderation effect on digital literacy shows that digital capabilities alone are not enough to encourage a more objective evaluation of information ([Ludwig & Sommer, 2024](#)). In polarized political situations, individuals tend to process information based on pre-owned political identities and preferences. These findings are in line with recent research showing that *motivated reasoning* and political polarization are often more influential than the ability of digital literacy to shape political beliefs ([Rekker & Hartevelde, 2024](#)).

This study develops an integrative model regarding the conversion of digital mobilization to political behavior. The proposed model distinguishes between digital mobilization as an *intermediate outcome* and a decision to choose as the *final outcome*. The results of the study show that not all forms of digital mobilization lead to a decision to choose. Mobilizations that come from direct interaction, two-way communication, and the provision of relevant services have a greater chance of conversion than mobilizations that are only information exposure. These findings enrich

the literature on digital political participation, which has tended to equate digital engagement with actual political behavior.




Figure 1. Final Structural Model (with significant paths)

Practical Implications

For successful candidates and teams: 1) Top priority: direct interaction. Allocate a minimum of 10-15 hours per week for live streaming, replying to comments, and DM responses. A special team formation for *community management* with a response target of under 2 hours for substantive questions. Personalization is very important use the name of the voter, refer to the previous conversation. 2) Reduce explicit support content that isn't substantive. Posting photos with officials or party symbols does not add value to critical urban voters. If you must show affiliations, combine them with stories about the impact of policies at the citizen level (e.g.: "Thanks to the President's support, the budget for road repairs in our village has increased by 200%"). 3) Services & incentives must be concrete, transparent, and sustainable. Don't just provide one-time assistance, but build an information system that makes it easier for residents to access public services. Use the *link in bio* feature for centralized registration. Make sure you don't get impressed by money politics by making the procedure clear and open. 4) For opposition candidates: conflict framing must be balanced with solutions. Framing without a solution (empty criticism) is only effective for an already fanatical base. To reach moderate or neutral voters, combine criticism with alternative policy offers and invitations for two-way dialogue. Example: "The price of basic necessities has increased because of policy X. I propose solution Y. What do you think? We will discuss live tomorrow night."

For political parties: 1) Form a digital rapid response team consisting of 3-5 people per candidate to handle digital interactions. 2) Train candidates in digital empathy: how to answer difficult questions, manage criticism, and build personal connections. 3) Develop an analytics dashboard to track interaction metrics (not just the number of likes/followers) such as response rate, average response time, and sentiment analysis.

For the KPU and policymakers: 1) Digital literacy needs to be measured objectively (tests, not self-reports) and integrated into voter education programs. 2) Collaborative #CekFakta and fact-checking campaigns need to be strengthened, but it must be realized that partisan bias can trump facts. Identity-based *approaches* (such as *practical tips from trusted community leaders*) may be more effective. 3) Regulations on digital campaigns need to consider the interactive aspect, not just the content. For example, rules on the candidate's response to voters' questions within a certain period.

Research Limitations

This research had several limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the study employed a cross-sectional design. Quantitative data were collected retrospectively after the election, preventing the establishment of the direction of causality. Although the PLS-SEM model assumed causal relationships based on theoretical foundations, the empirical evidence could not

rule out the possibility of reverse causality. For example, voters who had already decided to support a particular candidate may have been more likely to engage with that candidate's campaign content. Therefore, future longitudinal research incorporating both pre- and post-campaign measurements is needed to establish stronger causal inferences.

Second, the generalizability of the findings was limited. The sample consisted exclusively of Instagram users aged 17–30 years in DKI Jakarta. Consequently, the findings may not be applicable to older voters, residents of non-urban areas, or users of other social media platforms, such as TikTok or X (formerly Twitter). Furthermore, DKI Jakarta, as Indonesia's metropolitan region with the highest levels of education and internet penetration, possesses distinctive demographic and technological characteristics that may not reflect the broader Indonesian population. Because the survey was administered after the February 2024 election, the Y1 construct represented respondents' retrospective self-reports of actual voting behavior rather than prospective voting intentions. As a result, post-election recall bias, social desirability bias, and post hoc rationalization may have influenced both reported campaign exposure and voting behavior. Accordingly, the estimated path coefficients should be interpreted as associative rather than causal relationships.

Third, digital literacy was measured using subjective self-report scales, which are inherently susceptible to response bias. Future studies should incorporate objective assessments of digital literacy, such as tests evaluating respondents' ability to identify misinformation, understand recommendation algorithms, or manage digital privacy settings, to provide a more robust examination of the moderating role of digital literacy.

Fourth, the model did not examine mediation effects. Although direct interactions were found to significantly influence both Y1 and Y2, the study did not investigate whether Y2 mediated the relationship between campaign strategy and Y1. From a theoretical perspective, electoral mobilization may function as a partial mediator. Therefore, future research should extend the model by testing mediation effects using more comprehensive structural models.

Finally, there is a possibility of common method bias because all quantitative data were obtained from the same source through self-report questionnaires. Such an approach may artificially inflate the correlations among constructs. Nevertheless, Harman's single-factor test indicated that a single factor accounted for only 28% of the total variance, which is well below the commonly accepted threshold of 50%. This result suggests that common method bias was not a serious concern in the present study ([Podsakoff et al., 2003](#)).

CONCLUSION

This research has successfully developed and tested an effective social media use model to explain the conversion of digital mobilization into voting decisions among urban voters in DKI Jakarta. The findings show that winning candidates' digital communication strategies consist of four main types: Explicit Support, Direct Interaction, Opposition & Framing, and Service & Incentives, with different strategic patterns based on political affiliation. Pro-government candidates tend to emphasize service delivery and direct interaction, while opposition candidates are more dominant in opposition narratives and framing strategies. The structural model indicates that Direct Interaction is the strongest predictor of voting decisions ($\beta = 0.408$), followed by Service & Incentives ($\beta = 0.234$) and Opposition & Framing ($\beta = 0.123$), while Explicit Support has no significant effect, with the model explaining 60% of the variance in voting decisions.

Similarly, electoral mobilization is significantly influenced by Direct Interaction ($\beta = 0.549$) and Service & Incentives ($\beta = 0.153$), while other strategies do not show significant effects, with the model explaining 56.3% of the variance in electoral mobilization. Furthermore, digital literacy was not found to moderate the relationship between communication strategies and voting decisions, suggesting that partisan bias and motivated reasoning may play a stronger role than evaluative capacity in highly polarized political contexts. The multigroup analysis further reveals that the relationship between Opposition & Framing and voting decisions is significant only among respondents who follow opposition candidates, indicating patterns consistent with selective exposure, although this finding does not confirm a causal echo-chamber effect because follower selection and partisan identity were not independently controlled. Overall, the effective social media utilization model in DKI Jakarta is primarily characterized by direct two-way interaction and tangible public services rather than symbolic political affiliation or conflict-based

framing.

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AUTHOR CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT

This study offers theoretical, methodological, and practical contributions. Theoretically, it enriches the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) by demonstrating the dominance of the central route in social media communication, challenges universal assumptions regarding the moderating role of digital literacy, integrates partisan context variables (opposition versus pro-government) into the model, and provides an integrative framework that distinguishes electoral mobilization from voting decisions. Methodologically, the study demonstrates the application of a sequential explanatory mixed-methods approach to digital political communication research and validates measurement instruments for digital campaign strategies within the Indonesian context. Practically, the findings provide evidence-based guidance for candidates and political parties in designing effective digital campaigns and offer policy recommendations for the KPU regarding digital literacy initiatives and digital campaign regulations.

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